




















































representation	by	it	and	taking	responsibility	for	it.’15	When	an	action	is	attributable	to	me	in	this	normative	sense,	I	am	the	‘author’	of	that	action.	Paternalism	towards	another	person	is	only	justified	when	that	person	is	unable	to	‘author’	her	own	actions.	For	Schapiro,	there	is	an	imbalance	in	status	between	adults	and	children.	Childhood	is	a	‘liminal	stage	during	which	a	person	is	still	on	the	way	to	constituting	herself	as	a	source	of	activity	in	the	normative	sense.’16	Children	are	on	their	way	to	becoming	self-governing,	and	adults	have	a	duty	to	help	them	work	their	way	out	of	childhood.		 According	to	Schapiro,	adult	authority	is	only	preferable	to	children’s	own	instincts	insofar	as	it	does	a	better	job	of	protecting	her	interests.	As	stated,	the	paternalistic	attitude	that	adults	hold	towards	children	appears	to	be	justified	by	concern	for	children’s	welfare	and	the	thought	that	they	are	as	yet	unable	to	choose	well	for	themselves.	However,	considerations	of	proficiency	in	decision-making	only	appear	most	important	because	considerations	of	attributability	are	already	settled.17		Adult	paternalism	towards	children	can	only	be	justified	if:	1) Children	are	still	on	the	way	to	constituting	themselves	as	a	source	of	activity	in	the	normative	sense.	2) Adults	do	a	better	job	of	protecting	and	promoting	children’s	fundamental	interests	than	children’s	own	instincts.																																																									15	Ibid:	586.	
16	Ibid:	589.	
17	Ibid.	
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Importantly,	these	conditions	are	supplemented	by	the	claim	that	among	the	fundamental	interests	that	children	have	is	a	distinctive	
interest	in	becoming	self-governing.	Accordingly,	adult	authority	can	only	be	justified	when	it	protects	and	promotes	children’s	interests	better	that	children’s	own	instincts,	and	it	can	only	be	compatible	with	autonomy	if	its	goal	is	the	promotion	of	the	child’s	capacity	for	self-governance	in	the	long	run.		Manson’s	account	of	the	acquisition	of	normative	powers	during	adolescence	is	framed	in	terms	of	balancing	welfare	interests	and	autonomy	interests.	In	contrast,	Schapiro’s	depiction	of	adult-child	relationships	encompasses	children’s	developmental-autonomy	interests,	and	highlights	the	duty	that	adults	have	to	help	children	become	self-governing	in	the	long	run.	As	children	become	adolescents,	they	get	closer	to	being	self-governing	agents	and,	therefore,	paternalism	ought	to	be	gradually	rolled	back.	However,	they	have	not	yet	completed	the	task	of	becoming	self-governing,	and	adults	still	have	duties	to	discharge	towards	adolescents.	Accordingly,	adult-adolescent	relationships	are	not	yet	fully	reciprocal	and	adolescents	ought	not	to	be	treated	like	adults.	The	best	justification	of	a	period	of	transitional	paternalism	in	general	is	the	obligations	that	adults	have	towards	children	and	young	people	to	protect	and	promote	their	interests,	in	particular	children’s	distinctive	interest	in	becoming	self-governing.				4.	THE	GENERAL	PRACTICE	OF	TRANSITIONAL	PATERNALISM		
Faye	Tucker	‘Developing	Autonomy	and	Transitional	Paternalism’	
	 13	
	 So	far	I	have	argued	that	the	best	defence	of	a	period	of	
transitional	paternalism	in	general	is	the	duty	that	others	have	to	foster	children’s	self-governance.	In	this	section	I	will	offer	some	exposition	of	the	general	practice	of	transitional	paternalism.	Out	of	the	discussion	at	a	general	level,	we	can	draw	guiding	principles	for	transitional	paternalism.	The	intention	of	the	remainder	of	this	paper	is,	therefore,	to	reveal	which	considerations	are	involved	in	judgments	of	transitional	paternalism	in	general,	what	guiding	principles	we	might	draw,	and	how	these	guiding	principles	might	inform	our	practice	in	the	clinical	context	specifically.			
a)	What	is	autonomy	and	why	does	it	matter?	In	its	simplest	sense,	autonomy	is	about	a	person’s	ability	to	act	on	her	own	values	and	interests.	In	Manson’s	minimalist	negative	sense,	this	means	that	individuals	have	an	obligation	of	non-interference	with	other’s	choices.	However,	looked	at	psychologically,	autonomy	is	made	up	of	a	set	of	skills	and	attitudes.	Relevant	skills	include	the	ability	to	reason,	to	appreciate	different	points	of	view,	and	to	debate	with	others.	In	order	to	do	these	things,	and	make	known	her	choices,	the	autonomous	person	must	have	a	sense	of	self-worth	and	self-respect.	Self-knowledge	is	also	important,	including	a	well-developed	understanding	of	what	matters	to	them.	Many	of	these	requisites	for	autonomy	develop,	or	can	be	stunted,	during	adolescence.	To	develop	autonomy	in	this	sense,	a	person	needs	the	opportunity	to	consider	
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meaningful	alternatives.	This	depends	on	dialogue	between	persons	as	we	often	learn	about	ourselves	through	others’	responses,	and	it	is	easier	to	reconsider	our	values	when	we	hear	other	people’s	reasons	and	encounter	other	ways	of	looking	at	the	world.	Therefore,	the	kinds	of	skills	and	attitudes	that	are	compatible	with	autonomy	are	not	developed	in	isolation	from	the	world,	or	other	people.	Autonomy	matters	when	adolescents	make	choices,	including	in	cases	where	adolescents	have	to	make	important	decisions	about	medical	procedures.	Since	adults	have	obligations	to	young	people,	it	is	important	that	we	protect	young	people	from	making	‘bad	choices’,	that	is	choices	that	have	bad	consequences	for	them.	However,	if	we	are	to	promote	adolescents’	distinctive	interest	in	becoming	self-governing	agents,	we	must	also	foster	their	capacity	to	‘choose	well’.	That	means,	alongside	supporting	self-control,	adults	must	help	young	people	‘to	establish	a	deliberative	perspective	which	speaks	for	them,’18	from	which	they	can	consider	what	matters	to	them,	and	from	which	they	can	reason	effectively.	Manson’s	account	focuses	on	the	end	result	of	adolescents’	choices,	rather	than	the	process	of	choosing.	With	closer	attention	to	the	justification	of	a	period	of	transitional	paternalism,	we	can	see	that	the	general	practice	of	transitional	paternalism	is	guided	by	what	is	at	stake	for	adolescents	beyond	consideration	of	their	welfare.	Transitional	paternalism	may	well	protect	adolescents	from	some	bad	choices,	but	in	order	to	capture	the	sense	in	which	young	people	are	in																																																									18	Ibid:	589.		
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a	stage	of	transition,	this	period	must	also	foster	their	capacity	to	choose	well	for	themselves	in	the	long	run.			
b)	Fostering	a	deliberative	perspective	The	development	of	a	deliberative	perspective	that	speaks	for	them	requires	that	children	and	young	people	develop	the	kinds	of	skills	and	attitudes	compatible	with	autonomy.	A	young	person’s	experience	of,	and	participation	in,	the	choosing-process	is	fundamental	to	her	learning	about	choices	and	to	her	understanding	of	what	matters	to	her,	and	therefore	central	to	developing	a	deliberative	perspective	from	which	to	make	her	own	choices.		Adults	can	promote	children’s	distinctive	interest	in	becoming	self-governing	in	the	long	run,	in	part	by	providing	them	with	experience	of	making	decisions.	Along	these	lines,	Hugh	Lafollette	argues	that	‘lack	of	practice	making	decisions’19	undermines	autonomy.	He	writes:		As	toddlers	become	[...]	adolescents,	they	become	increasingly	able	to	assume	responsibility	and	to	make	decisions	about	their	own	lives.	We	must	nourish	these	abilities	if	children	are	to	become	responsible,	autonomous	adults.	That	requires	that	we	treat	them	as	if	they	were	already	partially	autonomous.	[...]	we	must	find	ways	to																																																									19	H.	LaFollette.	1998.	Circumscribed	Autonomy:	Children,	Care	and	Custody.	In	
Having	and	Raising	Children:	Unconventional	Families,	Hard	Choices,	and	the	Social	
Good.	U.	Narayan	&	J.J.	Bartkowiak,	eds.	State	College,	PA:	Pennsylvania	State	University	Press:	137-152:	148.	
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accommodate	children's	volitional	and	experiential	deficiencies	while	respecting	and	cultivating	their	burgeoning	autonomy.	20		 	LaFollette	recognises	that	children	are	deficient	in	the	capacities	that	enable	an	individual	to	be	autonomous,	and	in	the	experience	of	using	them.	However,	he	also	recognises	that	we	ought	to	support	the	
development	of	these	attributes.	As	Schapiro	states,	adults	have	special	obligations	to	children,	which	are	paternalistic	in	nature.21	These	include,	‘duties	to	protect,	nurture,	discipline,	and	educate	them.’	22	When	discharging	these	duties,	adults	must	take	into	consideration	children’s	distinctive	interest	in	becoming	self-governing	alongside	other	considerations.	The	sharing	of	normative	powers,	in	general,	facilitates	the	developmental	transition	by	enabling	adults	to	act	paternalistically	to	various	degrees.	On	Lafollette’s	account,	we	should	let	children	participate	in	important	matters	and	allow	them	to	express	their	views,	varying	the	degree	of	participation	that	adults	have	in	children’s	decision-making	throughout	their	development.	Other	parties	ought	to	participate	in	children’s	decision-making	only	as	part	of	the	developmental	course,	the	end	of	which	is	the	young	person’s	capacity	for	independent	decision-making.	When	we	include	adolescents	in	decisions,	we	consider	their	current	values	and	reasons	and	enable	them	to	mature	in	ways	that	will	allow	them	to	make	
																																																								20	Ibid:	138.	
21	T.	Schapiro.	What	is	a	Child?	Ethics	1999;	109:	715-738:	716.	
22	Ibid:	716.	
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decisions	on	their	own	and	make	them	well.	By	recognising	the	adolescent	as	a	deliberator,	we	acknowledge	her	capacity	for	autonomous	agency	and	provide	the	space	to	develop	the	capacities	required	for	autonomy.				
c)	What	guiding	principles	can	we	draw?	I	have	provided	some	discussion	of	what	the	general	practice	of	transitional	paternalism	might	involve,	in	light	of	the	earlier	justification	of	a	period	of	transitional	paternalism.	From	this	discussion	there	are	some	general	principles	that	we	can	draw.	First,	adults	have	obligations	to	promote	and	protect	young	people’s	interests.	Among	these	interests	is	children’s	distinctive	interest	in	becoming	self-governing	in	the	long	run.	Second,	to	become	self-governing,	children	do	not	simply	need	to	be	trained	in	which	choices	will	be	good	for	them,	but	must	establish	a	deliberative	perspective	of	their	own,	become	aware	of	what	matters	to	them,	and	have	experience	of	and	practice	at	decision	making.	Children	and	young	people	should	be	involved	in	decisions	that	affect	them	as	much	as	possible.	Third,	in	addition	to	cultivating	individual	self-governance,	we	have	a	duty	to	foster	the	kinds	of	social	conditions	that	support	autonomy	and	self-governance.		Adult-adolescent	relationships	are	complex	and	must	respond	to	an	adolescent’s	increased	willingness	and	capacity	to	take	responsibility	for	her	life	and	her	actions.	This	is	further	complicated	by	
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adult	expectations	that	adolescents	ought	to	be	more	responsible	in	respect	of	some	aspects	of	their	lives,	even	though	they	may	be	reluctant	to	assume	authority	themselves.	Adults,	who	have	the	right	kind	of	knowledge	about	an	adolescent,	are	in	a	position	to	respond	sensitively	to	her	needs	and	demands.23	In	light	of	this,	parents	and	carers	are	best	placed	to	be	able	to	react	to	the	changes	that	their	adolescent	is	undergoing.	As	children	mature	and	become	more	capable	of	self-governance,	and	adults	no	longer	do	a	better	job	at	protecting	and	promoting	young	people’s	interests	than	their	own	instincts,	adults	must	find	ways	to	discharge	their	obligations	to	young	people	that	are	not	unjustifiably	paternalistic.	This	might	mean,	for	instance,	ensuring	that	adolescents	come	to	this	part	of	their	lives	equipped	with	the	right	kind	of	skills	and	attitudes	to	make	decisions	well	on	their	own,	or	providing	young	people,	as	far	as	possible,	with	real	and	worthwhile	opportunities	However,	transitional	paternalism	in	the	context	of	the	family	is	likely	very	different	to	transitional	paternalism	in	formal	contexts.24	In	the	family	context	transitional	paternalism	is	about	responding	to	each																																																									23	It	should	be	noted	that,	during	adolescence,	adults	become	more	reliant	on	adolescents	themselves	as	a	source	of	information	about	their	lives,	further	complicating	adult-adolescent	relationships.	There	is	much	at	stake	for	adults	that	‘get	it	wrong’,	as	channels	of	communication	can	be	readily	shut	down	by	young	people.		
24	Developing	an	account	of	transitional	paternalism	in	the	family	context	is	a	project	of	great	interest	to	me.	However,	here	I	have	to	put	this	to	one	side	in	favour	of	pursuing	an	account	of	transitional	paternalism	in	general,	and	specifically,	how	transitional	paternalism	is	implemented	in	the	formal,	clinical	context.		
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adolescent’s	particular	capacities	as	she	matures.	Within	LaFollette’s	model	of	circumscribed	autonomy,	for	instance,	are	different	stages	that	reflect	the	gradualism	of	the	development	of	autonomy	in	young	people.	These	stages	facilitate	the	practice	of	decision-making	and	range	from	a	period	when	parents	can	always	participate	in	their	children’s	choices,	to	a	period	where	parents	are	more	likely	to	allow	children	to	make	more	serious	mistakes	and	bear	the	consequences.	Samantha	Brennan	worries	that	although	this	model	works	well	for	parents,	it	is	not	so	successful	when	the	freedoms	of	the	child	require	state-protection.25	Parents	are	able	to	adopt	a	more	nuanced	perspective	than	the	state,	when	it	comes	to	responding	to	their	child’s	developing	capabilities,	and	as	such	transitional	paternalism	is	likely	to	be	executed	differently	in	formal	contexts.		As	children	mature,	spheres	of	activity	become	open	or	closed	to	them.	We	could	think	of	formal	transitional	paternalism	as	mapping	onto	these	spheres	of	activity.	With	each	of	these	spheres	come	different	responsibilities,	and	different	normative	powers.	Consider,	for	example,	the	sphere	of	compulsory	education	in	which	a	child	or	adolescent	must	participate	until	a	particular	age.	Or,	the	sphere	of	sexual	activity	that	becomes	open	to	adolescents,	in	the	UK	at	least,	at	the	age	of	16.	In	each	case,	we	could	view	the	legislation	and	norms	around	the	opening	or	closing	of	each	sphere	of	activity	as	a	case	of																																																									25	S.	Brennan.	2002.	Children’s	Choices	or	Children’s	Interests:	Which	Do	their	Rights	Protect?	In	The	Moral	and	Political	Status	of	Children.	D.	Archard	&	C.	M.	Macleod,	eds.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press:	53-69.	
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transitional	paternalism.	Each	is	a	formalisation	of	the	transitional	stage,	which	reflects	the	young	person’s	move	towards	becoming	self-governing	and	promotes	and	protects	their	interests.	The	movement	through	these	spheres	in	stages	reflects	ideas	about	what	is	distinctive	about	the	developmental	period	of	adolescence,	a	time	when	individuals	are	coming	gradually	closer	to	being	self-governing.		Brennan	argues	that	‘some	legal	rules	may	need	to	be	applied	on	the	basis	of	coarse	lines	even	if	the	moral	facts	are	more	complex.’	26	In	formal	contexts,	transitional	paternalism	is	executed	on	the	basis	of	coarse	lines	informed	by	the	guiding	principles	drawn	from	transitional	paternalism	in	general.	The	guiding	principles	I	have	drawn	might,	for	example,	inform	the	coarse	lines	that	delineate	‘the	magical	age’27	when	a	sphere	of	activity	becomes	open	or	closed	to	a	child,	adolescent,	or	adult.	The	principles	that	guide	transitional	paternalism	in	general	also	inform	which	version	of	transitional	paternalism	–	symmetric	or	asymmetric	–	we	adopt	in	different	contexts.	In	the	final	section,	I	will	offer	reasons	for	preferring	the	asymmetric	version	of	transitional	paternalism	in	the	clinical	context.	
	
	5.	TRANSITIONAL	PATERNALISM	IN	THE	CLINICAL	CONTEXT		
																																																								26	Ibid:	61.	
27	LaFollette,	op.	cit.	note	19,	p.139.	
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So	far	I	have	offered	a	justification	for	a	period	of	transitional	paternalism	and	argued	that	this	justification	can	provide	insight	into	how	transitional	paternalism	might	be	implemented.	Cultivation	of	a	young	person’s	capacity	for	self-governance	provides	the	best	justification	of	transitional	paternalism	in	general,	and	explains	why	normative	powers	are	shared	during	this	transitional	period.	Transitional	paternalism	therefore	explains	how	we	come	to	have	shared	normative	powers	in	the	clinical	context.	In	this	section	I	will	argue	that	cultivation	of	a	young	person’s	capacity	for	self-governance	also	provides	the	best	defence	for	adopting	the	asymmetric	version	of	shared	normative	powers	in	the	clinical	context.	There	are	three	reasons	why	we	should	implement	transitional	paternalism	asymmetrically	in	the	clinical	context.	First,	the	asymmetric	version	of	transitional	paternalism	takes	seriously	duties	to	support	adolescents’	developing	autonomy,	alongside	other	duties	that	adults	have	to	young	people.	Second,	only	the	asymmetric	version	gives	consideration	to	young	people’s	voices	in	respect	of	all	clinical	actions,	and	this	leaves	open	the	possibility	that	coarse	legislative	lines	might	be	fine-tuned	in	individual	cases.	Third,	the	asymmetric	sharing	of	normative	powers	is	consistent	with	the	kind	of	social	arrangements	that	best	support	autonomy.	I	will	elaborate	on	each	of	these	reasons	in	turn.	First,	only	the	asymmetric	sharing	of	normative	powers	enables	young	people	to	be	involved	in	a	set	of	important	decisions	from	which	they	would	otherwise	be	excluded,	and	participation	of	this	sort	is	
central	to	the	cultivation	of	their	self-governance.	As	Schapiro	writes:	
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	The	aim	here	is	...	to	put	them	in	a	position	where	they	are	forced	to	come	up	with	provisional	principles	of	deliberation,	principles	whose	applicability	is	likely	to	extend	beyond	the	limits	of	the	questions	at	hand.	By	entering	into	the	business	of	acting	on	principle,	children	begin	to	construct	provisional	starting	points	for	deliberation	across	ever	widening	domains	of	discretion.28		An	analogy	might	go	some	way	to	illustrating	this.	Consider	the	dual	controls	in	a	driving	instructor’s	car.	In	this	situation,	the	learner	driver	is	given	some	autonomy	in	her	inexperienced	driving	decisions,	but	there	is	a	second	set	of	controls	that	can	be	used	by	the	instructor	should	the	learner	need	assistance.	The	sharing	of	power	in	this	case	provides	a	space	where	the	learner	is	able	to	experience	a	limited	amount	of	autonomy	in	which	to	learn	to	drive,	without	assuming	complete	responsibility	for	her	decisions.	In	this	way	the	learner	is	protected	from	making	bad	mistakes,	and	she	is	also	acquiring	the	skills	she	needs	to	drive	unaided	in	the	future.	Returning	to	the	clinical	context,	the	asymmetric	sharing	of	normative	powers	is	most	compatible	with	the	adolescent’s	development.	The	‘learner’	is	treated	as	if	she	is,	to	some	degree,	already	autonomous	providing	the	right	conditions	to	foster	her	developing	autonomy.	The	constrained	nature	of	this	situation	provides	security,	transparency,	and	opportunity	for	reflection,	which	are	fundamental	to	the	learning	process.	With	time	and	practice,	a	young	person	will	develop	the	self-awareness,	self-																																																								28	Schapiro,	op.	cit.	note	21,	p.736.	
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knowledge	and	the	self-trust	needed	to	develop	a	deliberative	perspective	of	their	own.	In	the	clinical	context,	adolescents	are	able	to	make	decisions	for	themselves	insofar	as	their	decisions	do	as	good	a	job	as	adults’	decisions	in	protecting	and	promoting	their	own	interests.	Participation	in	important	decisions	presents	them	with	the	chance	to	consider	meaningful	alternatives,	both	opportunities	for	action	and	ways	of	thinking	about	what	matters.	In	fact,	participation	in	decisions,	whether	life-saving	or	not,	has	the	potential	to	involve	adolescents	in	meaningful	processes	of	critical	reflection.	They	are	able	to	‘try	out’	their	reasoning	skills,	and	may	even	reconsider	their	values	in	light	of	other	people’s	reasons.		Second,	only	the	asymmetric	version	allows	the	adolescent	to	have	a	voice	in	respect	of	all	clinical	actions,	and	this	is	important	because	it	leaves	open	the	possibility	of	nuancing	the	necessarily	‘broad-brush’	legislation	around	adolescent	consent.	We	have	legitimate	and	important	concerns	that	young	people	make	choices	that	are	good	for	them,	as	well	as	make	choices	well.	The	asymmetric	version	of	transitional	paternalism	takes	seriously	developing	autonomy	and	concern	for	an	adolescent’s	welfare.	When	refusal	of	a	clinical	action	puts	an	adolescent’s	welfare	at	risk,	others	hold	the	power	to	consent	on	her	behalf.	This	is	the	‘coarse	line’	that	is	drawn	in	the	formal	context	in	response	to	the	complex	moral	facts	about	adolescence,	a	time	when	young	people	are	nearing	self-governance	but	when	adults	continue	to	have	duties	towards	them.	However,	in	those	
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occasional	cases	when	an	adolescent	does	refuse	treatment,	the	courts	and	doctors	must	give	the	adolescent’s	opinion	consideration.	The	practice	of	considering	the	adolescent’s	reasons	for	refusal	when	coming	to	a	decision	about	her	treatment	offers	an	opportunity	to	‘fine-tune’	the	coarse	lines	that	have	been	drawn	in	the	clinical	context.	It	could	be	argued	that	the	point	at	which	symmetrical	normative	powers	become	available	to	individuals	(when	they	achieve	adult	status)	may	be	a	‘blunt	instrument’,	but	the	practice	of	including	adolescents	in	these	important	decisions	before	that	time	does	mean	that	adolescents’	opinions	are,	at	the	very	least,	given	consideration.	This	leaves	open	the	potential	for	respecting	the	adolescent’s	wishes	in	some	cases,	and	only	the	asymmetric	version	allows	this	to	happen.	Third,	the	practice	of	including	adolescents	in	all	decisions	about	clinical	actions	that	affect	them	is	in	line	with	the	kind	of	principles	that	underlie	clinical	practice	more	generally,	and	fosters	the	kind	of	social	conditions	that	promote	autonomy	and	self-governance.	This	paper,	and	others	that	defend	an	asymmetric	position,	face	the	prima	facie	objection	that	the	choice	offered	to	adolescents	is	bogus,	and	represents	the	very	antithesis	of	autonomy.	That	is,	the	‘choice’	offered	to	adolescents	is	not	a	real	choice	at	all	because	only	the	‘right’	decision	will	be	respected	by	others.	As	I	have	argued	in	this	paper,	far	from	being	the	antithesis	of	autonomy,	the	practice	of	asymmetric	consent	in	the	clinical	context	is	compatible	with	autonomy.	Returning	to	the	analogy	of	the	learner	driver,	it	seems	intuitively	obvious	that	the	learner	driver	is	exercising	a	degree	of	real	autonomy.	If	the	analogy	
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holds,	then	it	follows	that	the	adolescent	participating	in	clinical	decisions	under	the	conditions	of	transitional	paternalism	is	likewise	exercising	a	degree	of	real	autonomy.	Furthermore,	if	the	argument	presented	in	this	paper	is	right	there	are	good	reasons	to	let	young	people	have	a	go	at	making	their	own	decisions,	even	though	they	might	be	overridden	if	they	put	themselves	in	danger.	Again,	if	the	learner	driver	analogy	holds,	there	are	good	reasons	to	let	the	learner	try	the	tricky	move,	even	knowing	that	the	instructor	will	have	to	override	them	if	it	goes	wrong.	The	practice	of	including	adolescents	in	important	decisions	that	affect	them,	under	conditions	of	transitional	paternalism,	supports	young	people’s	ability	to	use	their	normative	powers	effectively	in	the	future,	and	more	properly	prepares	them	to	take	responsibility	for	their	choices	in	the	long	run.	The	justification	for	presenting	the	adolescent	with	a	choice,	all	be	it	provisionally	and	not	conclusively,	in	this	context	is	not	to	maximise	their	autonomy	in	the	short-term,	as	it	might	be	in	other	situations	where	we	are	presented	with	choices,	but	to	cultivate	self-governance	in	the	long	run.			6.	CONCLUDING	REMARKS		 This	paper	has	discussed	how	the	general	practice	of	transitional	paternalism	might	look	in	formal	contexts.	It	is	clear	that	adolescence	presents	a	complex	developmental	period,	and	is	a	time	when	decisions	
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about	how	to	treat	any	one	individual	must	respond	to	their	particular	capabilities	and	needs.	When	we	are	considering	transitional	paternalism	within	formal	contexts,	there	are	obvious	limitations	to	how	well	we	are	able	to	respond	to	the	capabilities	and	needs	of	individual	adolescents.	Any	‘coarse	lines’	are	bound	to	inadequately	respond	to	the	nuances	of	each	adolescent’s	developmental	progress.	In	some	contexts,	when	we	require	a	set	of	general	guidelines	to	provide	consistency,	‘blunt	instruments’	may	be	the	best	we	can	do.	At	some	point	adolescents	must	acquire	adult	status	in	respect	of	the	different	spheres	of	their	life,	and	we	may	have	to	adopt	less	than	perfect	standards	in	some	cases.	Transitional	paternalism,	in	general,	offers	guiding	principles	that	can	protect	and	promote	adolescents’	fundamental	interests	in	formal	contexts.	It	might	appear	that	questions	about	which	version	of	transitional	paternalism	best	promotes	adolescent	interests	in	a	particular	context	are	decided	by	considerations	about	welfare.	However,	this	is	because	the	transitional	
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